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1513 
ONE LESS JUROR: A DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO JUROR 
SUBSTITUTION 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK 
APPELLATE DIVISION, SECOND DEPARTMENT 
People v. McDuffie1 
(decided May 8, 2012) 
 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Recently, the Appellate Division, Second Department re-
viewed People v. McDuffie2 to determine whether defendant had 
properly submitted a jury substitution waiver, and thus, properly 
waived his right to a jury trial.3 
In McDuffie, defendant was brought up on charges of second-
degree murder and criminal possession of a weapon.4  One day after 
deliberations began, Juror Number One declined to continue serving 
on the jury.5  Consequently, the court allowed defendant and his at-
torney to confer about whether to substitute one of the alternate jurors 
for Juror Number One, while the court proceeded with another case.6  
When defendant’s case reconvened, the court signed the juror substi-
tution form previously signed by defendant, without first speaking 
with him.7  The alternate juror was then seated and deliberations con-
tinued.8  Shortly after, the jury reached a verdict of guilty.9  Defend-
ant subsequently appealed the decision, claiming that the juror substi-
 
1 943 N.Y.S.2d 594 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2012). 
2 Id. at 594. 
3 Id. at 595. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 McDuffie, 943 N.Y.S.2d at 595. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 594, 595. 
1
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tution was invalid.10 
After reviewing the record before it, the appellate court con-
cluded that the juror substitution was invalid and ordered a new tri-
al.11  The court found that defendant’s “election,” allowing substitu-
tion of the juror, had not been completed according to the New York 
State Constitution or Criminal Procedure Law section 270.35.12  The 
court based its decision on the fact that the record had neither indicat-
ed that the consent form was signed in “open court” nor that the court 
had conducted a colloquy to ensure that defendant was making a 
knowing and understanding waiver.13 
One of the bases for the appellate court’s ruling was the deci-
sion in People v. Teatom,14 which was decided only a few months 
prior to McDuffie.  In Teatom, defendant was charged with driving 
while intoxicated and other traffic infractions, after he drove his ve-
hicle off the road and struck a telephone pole.15  Defendant was later 
convicted following a jury trial, and subsequently, appealed the con-
viction.16  One of the grounds for the appeal was that the trial court 
had failed to comply with Criminal Procedure Law section 270.35.17  
The appellate court agreed with defendant, reversed the trial court’s 
decision, and ordered a new trial.18  The court arrived at its decision 
despite the fact that the juror had been discharged upon defendant’s 
request.19 
The appellate court observed that the trial court had not ob-
tained a signed consent from defendant until the day after the juror 
had been substituted.20  Rather, the trial court had allowed the delib-
erations of the previous day to continue after discharging the original 
juror, substituting the alternate, and only directing the jury to restart 
the deliberation process.21  Further, the court found that the record 
 
10 Id. at 595. 
11 McDuffie, 943 N.Y.S.2d at 595, 596. 
12 Id. at 595. 
13 Id. 
14 936 N.Y.S.2d 379 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2012). 
15 Id. at 380. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 381.  Defendant also appealed his conviction on the ground that the conviction for 
driving while intoxicated was not properly supported by evidence of his intoxication because 
he had only become intoxicated after the accident, which bore no witnesses.  Id. at 380. 
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had not indicated that the consent form was signed in open court.22  
The court deemed this a violation of “defendant’s fundamental right 
to a trial by a jury of 12.”23 
In order to fully understand the issue of juror substitution, it is 
necessary to explore the history of a criminal defendant’s right to trial 
by a jury.  The two concepts are inextricably linked because a de-
fendant’s right to juror substitution emerged as a result of the need to 
protect a defendant’s right to a jury trial.  This Note will explore the 
history of a criminal defendant’s right to trial by jury and its nexus 
with the juror substitution process. 
II. HISTORY OF FEDERAL RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY 
Under federal law, a defendant’s right to a jury trial is enu-
merated in Article III, section 2, clause 3 of the United States Consti-
tution.24  The provision provides: 
The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeach-
ment, shall be by jury; and such trial shall be held in 
the state where the said crimes shall have been com-
mitted; but when not committed within any state, the 
trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress 
may by law have directed.25 
Prior to being codified in the United States Constitution, the 
right to trial by jury had been in existence in England and linked to 
credible sources, such as the Magna Carta.26  Its function of protect-
ing defendants against arbitrary rulings was set out in the Declaration 
and Bill of Rights of 1689 as an important objective of the “revolu-
tionary settlement.”27  The declaration “[t]hat trial by jury is the in-
herent and invaluable right of every British subject in these colonies,” 
was “adopted by the First Congress of the American Colonies (the 
Stamp Act Congress) on October 19, 1765.”28  The authors of the 
 
22 Id. 
23 Teatom, 936 N.Y.S.2d at 381. 
24
 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.  See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1968) (sug-
gesting that the right to trial by jury was included in the federal Constitution because defend-
ants in the colonies were being tried by judges controlled by the King, and in some cases, 
being sent back to England to be tried for offenses that occurred in the Colonies). 
25 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
26 Duncan, 391 U.S. at 151. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 152. 
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declaration considered it one of the most important of the rights and 
liberties possessed by the colonists.29  Thereafter, the importance of 
the right to trial by jury was re-established by the proposition and 
adoption of the Sixth Amendment within the Bill of Rights.30  It pro-
vided in relevant part, that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury 
of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been commit-
ted.”31 
Along with the Sixth Amendment, Rules 23 and 24 of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were enacted to clarify the 
boundaries of the right to a jury trial.  Rule 23(a) provides that if a 
defendant is entitled to a jury trial, waiver can be achieved, but only 
if it is in writing, the government consents, and it is approved by the 
court.32  Rule 23(b) provides that even though a jury consists of 
twelve individuals, at any time prior to a verdict, the parties can agree 
and stipulate in writing to a jury of less than twelve individuals, or al-
ternatively, that the court may allow fewer than twelve jurors to re-
turn a verdict upon finding good cause to excuse a juror after the be-
ginning of deliberations.33  The rule further provides that “[a]fter the 
jury has retired to deliberate, the court may permit a jury of 11 per-
sons to return a verdict, even without a stipulation by the parties, if 
the court finds good cause to excuse a juror.”34  Rule 24 (c) provides 
that the court may retain alternate jurors after deliberations have 
commenced in the event that a juror needs to be replaced.35  Howev-
er, the rule further provides that “[t]he court must ensure that a re-
tained alternate does not discuss the case with anyone until that alter-
nate replaces a juror or is discharged.  If an alternate replaces a juror 
 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 153.  See Sanjay Chhablani, DISENTANGLING THE SIXTH AMENDMENT, 11 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 487 (2009).  The author points out that the Supreme Court has incorpo-
rated the provisions of the Sixth Amendment into the rights guaranteed by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and thus, provides defendants being tried in state 
courts with the same procedural safeguards as defendants being tried in the federal courts.  
Id. at 494.  However, two of the Sixth Amendment provisions were not incorporated to apply 
in the same respect to state courts.  Id. at 549 n.24.  The first is that even though unanimity is 
required for a jury verdict in federal courts it is not required in state court.  Id.  Second, even 
though a twelve-member jury is required in federal court a jury of less than this amount is 
proper in state courts.  Id. 
31 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
32 FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(a). 
33 FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b). 
34 Id. 
35 FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(c). 
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after deliberations have begun, the court must instruct the jury to 
begin its deliberations anew.”36 
A. United States Supreme Court Cases 
One of the seminal cases in which the United States Supreme 
Court dealt with a defendant’s right to substitute a juror was Patton v. 
United States.37  In Patton, defendants were brought up on charges of 
bribing a “federal prohibition agent.”38  The charge carried a sentence 
of one year in a federal penitentiary.39  A jury of twelve individuals 
was assembled and the trial began.40  It continued for approximately 
seven days until one of the jurors became ill and was unable to con-
tinue.41 
As a result, the prosecutor and defense counsel, with defend-
ant’s consent, stipulated in court that the trial be allowed to continue 
with the eleven remaining jurors.42  Thereafter, the court consented to 
the stipulation, stating that: (1) both parties were entitled to a twelve-
member jury; and (2) a mistrial had to be declared unless they were 
willing to waive any objections and agree to resolve the matter with 
the remaining eleven member jury.43  After the court’s statement, all 
the parties renewed the earlier stipulation.44  Defense counsel then 
stated that after conferring with the defendants and all of the counse-
lors, they all wished to continue the trial with the remaining eleven 
jurors, as long as the defendants were able to waive the “presence of 
the twelfth juror.”45  The trial continued with the eleven jurors and 
ended the next day with the conviction of the defendants for the 
charged crimes.46 
The defendants subsequently appealed their convictions to the 
circuit court, claiming that they did not have the authority to waive 
 
36 Id. 
37 281 U.S. 276 (1930). 




42 Patton, 281 U.S. at 286. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 286. 
45 Id. at 286-87. 
46 Id. at 287. 
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their constitutional right to a jury consisting of twelve individuals.47  
The court of appeals, in turn, certified the question to the United 
States Supreme Court to determine whether, under the Constitution, 
if a federal trial has begun with a twelve member jury and a juror lat-
er becomes “incapacitated” and unable to carry out his/her duties, the 
parties can choose to have the remaining eleven jurors proceed and 
render a verdict, thus waiving the right to a trial and verdict by a 
twelve member jury pool.48 
In arriving at its decision, the Court first examined the mean-
ing of “trial by jury.”49  The Court interpreted it to be inclusive of all 
the “essential elements” in America and England when the Constitu-
tion was ratified and through its existence at common law.50  The 
court determined that “jury” meant a panel consisting of “twelve 
men, neither more nor less.”51  The Court declared that there was no 
distinct difference between the right to completely waive a jury trial 
and the right to consent to a verdict by less than twelve jurors, and 
thus, concluded that they should be treated the same.52 
However, in arriving at its decision, the court interpreted the 
constitutional provision as a privilege extended to the accused, and 
thus, a right that he may “forego at his election.”53  The Court cau-
tioned that denying a defendant the right to waive the privilege would 
in essence turn the right into an overbearing requirement.54  In hold-
ing that a defendant possesses the right to waive trial by a jury or to 
consent to a verdict by less than twelve jurors, the Court cautioned 
that though a defendant possessed the right, it did not mean that it 
should be instituted in all circumstances.55  The court explained that 
trial by jury is the “normal” and “preferable” way of disposing of a 
criminal matter for a non-petty offense, and thus, should not be se-
cond-guessed.56  The court established that in order for there to be a 
constitutional waiver, defendant’s “express and intelligent consent,” 
the consent of the prosecuting attorney, and the approval of the court 
 
47 Patton, 281 U.S. at 287. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 288. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Patton, 281 U.S. at 290. 
53 Id. at 296, 298. 
54 Id. at 298. 
55 Id. at 312. 
56 Id. 
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must be acquired.57  Furthermore, the court cautioned that courts 
must use “sound and advised discretion, with an eye to avoid unrea-
sonable or undue departures from that mode of trial,” and increase the 
level of caution according to the degree of the offense.58 
Later in Duncan v. Louisiana,59 the Supreme Court held that 
all criminal cases that would have fallen within the purview of the 
Sixth Amendment, had they been tried in federal court, were guaran-
teed the right to trial by a jury.60  In Duncan, defendant was originally 
tried in a district court in the state of Louisiana.61  According to the 
facts, defendant was driving on a highway when he noticed two of his 
younger cousins, who were negroes, talking to four other white 
boys.62  Defendant, knowing of recent racial tensions at his cousins’ 
school, pulled over, spoke to the white boys and encouraged his cous-
ins to get into his car and leave.63  The parties presented differing sto-
ries as to the series of events that followed.64  The white boys stated 
that defendant hit one of them while the negroes stated that defendant 
had only touched the boy.65  The trial judge subsequently found de-
fendant guilty of simple battery, sentenced him to sixty days in parish 
prison and imposed a one hundred and fifty dollar fine.66 
Under Louisiana law, the conviction carried a maximum sen-
tence of two years and a fine of three hundred dollars.67  Defendant 
originally sought a jury trial, but his request was denied because Lou-
isiana only allowed jury trials in death penalty cases or cases that car-
ried a sentence of “imprisonment at hard labor.”68  Defendant ap-
pealed his conviction to the Louisiana Supreme Court, arguing that 
the denial of his right to a jury trial violated his constitutional right.69  
The Louisiana court denied defendant’s writ, finding no error in the 
law.70  Defendant subsequently appealed to the United States Su-
 
57 Patton, 281 U.S. at 312. 
58 Id. at 312-13. 
59 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
60 Id. at 149. 
61 Id. at 146. 
62 Id. at 147. 
63 Id. 
64 Duncan, 391 U.S. at 147. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 146, 147. 
67 Id. at 146. 
68 Id. 
69 Duncan, 391 U.S. at 146. 
70 Id. 
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preme Court, claiming Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment violations 
of the right to trial by a jury in a state case where the charged crime 
carried a sentence of up two years.71 
The Supreme Court held that defendant was entitled to a jury 
trial, and thus, the court erred when it failed to provide it to defend-
ant.72  The Court, in forming its decision, explained that the right to a 
jury trial is extended to defendants in criminal matters to prevent 
“oppression by the government.”73  The Court stated that the framers 
of the Constitution included the right to a jury trial in order to guard 
citizens against arbitrary governmental actions.74  The Court further 
observed that a defendant’s right to be tried by his peers is a neces-
sary safeguard against the “overzealous prosecutor” and a “compli-
ant, biased or eccentric judge.”75  The Court expressed that crimes 
bearing sentences of up to six months did not require a trial by jury if 
they are petty offenses in every sense.76 
Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court faced a similar issue in 
Williams v. Florida.77  In Williams, defendant was brought up on 
robbery charges in Florida state court.78  Prior to trial, he filed a mo-
tion requesting a jury of twelve instead of the six-juror requirement 
under Florida law in cases other than capital cases.79  The motion was 
denied and defendant was convicted and given a life sentence.80  The 
Court needed to answer the question of whether the Constitution 
guaranteed a defendant the right to trial by a jury of twelve members, 
as opposed to a lesser amount.81 
In Williams, the Court rejected the premise in Patton that the 
authors of the Constitution intended that a constitutional jury must 
include the exact characteristics of the common law jury.82  The 
Court found it more fitting to inquire into the function of the jury and 
 
71 Id. at 146-47. 
72 Id. at 162. 
73 Id. at 155. 
74 Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 159. 
77 399 U.S. 78 (1970). 
78 Id. at 79. 
79 Id. at 79-80. 
80 Id. at 80. 
81 Id. at 86. 
82 Williams, 399 U.S. at 99. 
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its importance to the purpose of the trial.83  Based on its analysis, the 
Court concluded that the twelve-member requirement was not an “in-
dispensable component of the Sixth Amendment.”84  The Court em-
phasized that the inherent protection afforded by a jury derives from 
its role in providing the “commonsense judgment” of a group of av-
erage citizens, and “the community participation and shared respon-
sibility that results from that group’s determination of guilt or inno-
cence.”85 
Further, the Court pointed out that it was not the size of the 
group that provided the benefit; it was the fact that the group was big 
enough to foster deliberation free from outside intimidation and 
“provide a fair possibility” of getting representatives from a “cross-
section of the community.”86  The Court further stated that it did not 
find this result any less likely with a group of six jurors, and accord-
ingly, ruled that defendant’s right to trial by a jury was not violated 
when Florida provided a jury of six individuals instead of twelve.87 
B. Second Circuit Cases 
One of the main cases in the Second Circuit dealing with juror 
substitution is United States v. Hillard.88  Hillard was the Second 
Circuit’s first discussion of the implications of Rule 24(c) on the sub-
stitution of jurors.89  The case involved defendants who were appeal-
ing their convictions from charges related to a heroin operation.90 
One of the issues raised on appeal was that an improper juror 
substitution had taken place after the case was submitted to the jury.91  
A juror had been substituted for an original juror who had fallen ill 
after two and-a-half days of deliberations and a three-day holiday 
break.92  The juror was substituted after the judge discussed different 
possibilities with counsel and defendants refused to stipulate to an 
 
83 Id. at 99-100. 
84 Id. at 100. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Williams, 399 U.S. at 100, 103. 
88 701 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1983). 
89 Id. at 1055. 
90 Id. at 1054. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 1054-55. 
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eleven-member jury or a one-day adjournment.93  As a result, the 
judge proceeded with the juror substitution after he decided that fur-
ther delay of the deliberations would lead to a negative result.94  The 
court found that the substitute juror who had been asked to remain af-
ter the case was submitted to the jury was kept separate and only ac-
companied the jury when it went to the courtroom to listen to testi-
mony or to re-read or get additional jury instructions.95 
The court in Hillard dealt with an asserted challenge to Rule 
24(c), that any substitution of a juror after the beginning of delibera-
tions was a violation of the rule, and as such, required reversal.96  
Rule 24(c), at the time, only provided for the replacement of jurors 
“prior to the time the jury retire[d] to consider its verdict” and re-
quired discharge of alternates “after the jury retire[d] to consider its 
verdict.”97  Though the court agreed with defendant’s view that the 
rule limited the substitution of jurors to the pre-deliberation stage, it 
disagreed that a violation of the rule required per se reversal of a ver-
dict.98  The court ruled in accord with the Fifth Circuit, that absent 
prejudice to a defendant, a violation of Rule 24(c) did not implicate 
per se reversal of a verdict.99  The court, thereafter, found that there 
was no prejudice to defendant because the substitute juror did not in-
fluence the deliberations by the twelve original jurors because he was 
kept separate until the substitution took place; and further, the juror 
had stated that he was not swayed by his discussions with another al-
ternate juror.100  The court also cautioned that absent “a change in the 
rule, juror substitution should be permitted only in complex cases 
where thorough precautions are taken to ensure that the defendants 
are not prejudiced.”101 
In arriving at its decision, the court also considered whether 
the substitution procedure outlined in Rule 24(c) was consistent with 
the features of the jury that were essential to its operation.102  The 
court found that Rule 24(c) was indeed consistent with the essential 
 
93 Hillard, 701 F.2d at 1055. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 1057. 
97 Id. 
98 Hillard, 701 F.2d at 1057-58. 
99 Id. at 1058. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 1061. 
102 Id. at 1056. 
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feature of the jury.103  Based on this finding, the court concluded that 
the substitution by the court was proper because: (1) the alternate was 
chosen at the same time and through the same procedure as the other 
jurors; (2) he heard all the same evidence and instructions as the orig-
inal jurors; and (3) the replacement juror re-affirmed that he would be 
able to “consider the evidence and deliberate fairly and fully” and 
stipulated that his discussion of the case with the second alternate had 
not impacted his opinion of the case.104  The court also found it per-
suasive that the judge had instructed the jury to start the deliberation 
process anew after the substitution.105 
In a more recent case, United States v. Carmenate,106 the Se-
cond Circuit dealt with a challenge to a waiver under Rule 23(a) of 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.107  There, the court empha-
sized the importance of creating a record evidencing a jury waiver 
that is inclusive of a formal questioning or colloquy of the defendant 
(even though it is not required for a constitutional waiver of the right 
to trial by a jury).108 
In Carmenate, defendant was convicted of bank fraud in a 
bench trial.109  Defendant appealed the conviction claiming that the 
trial court violated his constitutional right to trial by jury.110  Defend-
ant’s claim on appeal arose from the fact that, during a pre-trial con-
ference, he informed the court that he wished to have a bench trial in 
order to avoid having an employee of the bank he was accused of de-
frauding, testify against him in front of a jury.111  The prosecution 
consented to the bench trial and the court requested a written waiver 
at the final pre-trial conference.112  Defendant later claimed that his 
constitutional right was violated because: (1) he did not sign a written 
waiver in accordance with Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure; and (2) his oral consent to the waiver was not “know-
ing, voluntary, or intelligent,” because it did not apprise him of the 
 
103 Hillard, 701 F.2d at 1056. 
104 Id. at 1056-57. 
105 Id. at 1057. 
106 544 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2008). 




111 Carmenate, 544 F.3d at 106. 
112 Id. 
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scope of the right and the repercussions of his waiver.113 
However, the court disagreed with defendant and held that his 
waiver was indeed “knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.”114  The 
court arrived at its decision by evaluating the three requirements of 
Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedures.115  Specifi-
cally, the rule requires that to waive a jury trial: (1) the defendant 
must put the waiver in writing; (2) the government must give its con-
sent; and (3) the court must approve the waiver.116  The court restated 
its previous recommendation that prior to granting a waiver, a court 
should inform the defendant of the importance of a jury trial and of 
the process of selecting the jury; and also, that if the defendant 
waives the right to a jury trial, the judge will be the sole decision 
maker in the case.117  However, the court explained that the recom-
mendations were merely suggestions and not required for a constitu-
tional waiver.118 
Subsequently, the court went on to explain that a court must 
evaluate all the circumstances of the case prior to granting a defend-
ant’s waiver.119  The court further explained, however, that even 
though these steps were not taken in defendant’s case, the flaw was 
not fatal.120  The court concluded that defendant’s waiver was indeed 
valid because defendant: (1) was present at the original pre-trial con-
ference where his attorney informed the court of his wish to proceed 
with the bench trial; (2) was also present at the final pre-trial confer-
ence where his written consent was obtained; and (3) the court re-
viewed defendant’s request at the beginning of the bench trial and 
questioned defendant about his decision.121 
Defendant also argued that the waiver presented to the court 
was invalid because it had been signed by his counselor and not by 
him.122  With regard to this argument, the court agreed with the First, 




115 Id. at 107. 
116 Carmenate, 544 F.3d at 107. 
117 Id. at 107-08. 
118 Id. at 108. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 108. 
121 Carmenate, 544 F.3d at 108. 
122 Id. at 109. 
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versible error.123  The court concluded that while Rule 23(a) seemed 
to require a defendant’s signature on the written waiver, the absence 
of defendant’s signature was not reversible error as long as the de-
fendant’s waiver is otherwise “knowing, voluntary and intelligent.”124  
Here, the court concluded that “defendant’s waiver was knowing, 
voluntary and intelligent.”125 
III. HISTORY OF NEW YORK’S RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY 
The right to trial by jury in New York State was first set out in 
the original Charter of Liberties and Privileges in 1683, which was 
ratified by the first legislature.126  The right was also recognized by 
New York in its first constitution after it became a state.127  Article I, 
Section 2 of the New York Constitution, guarantees a criminal de-
fendant the right to a jury trial as it existed at common law.128  This 
implied a jury of twelve members, because at common law a jury was 
comprised of twelve individuals.129  Originally, this right was consid-
ered so fundamental that no party was allowed to waive it.130  A de-
fendant was precluded from waiver even in instances where the de-
fendant explicitly requested and consented to be tried by a jury of less 
than twelve jurors.131  In 1846, an amendment to the constitution was 
passed which provided for waiver of the right to trial by jury in civil 
actions.132  This amendment allowed a defendant in a civil case to 
waive the right to trial by jury, thereby allowing trial by a single 
judge or trial by a jury of less than twelve members.133  This would 
later impact waivers of trial by jury in the criminal arena. 
In 1858, the Court of Appeals decided Cancemi v. People.134  
In Cancemi, an eleven-member jury convicted defendant of mur-





126 People v. Gajadhar, 880 N.E.2d 863, 865 (N.Y. 2007). 
127 Id. at 865. 
128 People v. Page, 665 N.E.2d 1041, 1043 (N.Y. 1996). 
129 Id. at 1043. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Gajadhar, 880 N.E.2d at 865. 
133 Id. at 865-66. 
134 18 N.Y. 128 (1858). 
135 Id. at 130-31. 
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ed to the dismissal of the twelfth juror after the jurors were impan-
elled and the trial had begun.136  Defendant subsequently appealed his 
conviction claiming that the judgment should be reversed because he 
was tried by a jury of only eleven members, a panel not recognized at 
common law, and thus, unconstitutional.137  The court agreed, and 
held that a withdrawal of one juror rendered the verdict unconstitu-
tional.138  The court reasoned that the constitution and laws required a 
twelve member jury when a case is brought out of an indictment, and 
thus, neither a defendant nor a prosecuting attorney were in a position 
to consent to any change in the number.139 
Post-Cancemi, New York courts continued to adhere to the 
twelve-juror requirement for a constitutional trial.  However, in 1935 
the Judicial Counsel sought legislative amendment to the constitu-
tion.140  It proposed the establishment of a “concurrent resolution” in 
the constitution providing for waiver of a jury trial for criminal de-
fendants who were not being charged with capital offenses.141  The 
resolution was passed in 1937, ratified by voters and became effec-
tive January 1, 1938.142  The amendment provided that waiver of a ju-
ry trial may be accomplished in a manner to be determined by law, 
except in cases where a defendant was charged with a crime that car-
ries as its punishment, death.143  Later that same year, the constitution 
was again amended to include the express provision that waiver of a 
trial by jury was to be made in writing, signed by defendant in open 
court, and with approval from the presiding judge or justice.144  Since 
1938, the State constitution has not been modified and currently pro-
vides that 
[t]rial by jury in all cases in which it has heretofore 
been guaranteed by constitutional provision shall re-
main inviolate forever; but a jury trial may be waived 
by the parties in all civil cases in the manner to be pre-
 
136 Id. at 129, 130-31. 
137 Id. at 131. 
138 Id. at 138. 
139 Cancemi, 18 N.Y. at 138. 
140 Gajadhar, 880 N.E.2d at 866. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Page, 665 N.E.2d at 1043. 
144 Id.; see also Gajadhar, 880 N.E.2d at 866-67 (stating that in 1938 an amendment was 
made to Article I, Section 2, inserting language that specified the procedure for waiver of a 
jury trial). 
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scribed by law.  The legislature may provide, howev-
er, by law, that a verdict may be rendered by not less 
than five-sixths of the jury in any civil case.  A jury 
trial may be waived by the defendant in all criminal 
cases, except those in which the crime charged may be 
punishable by death, by a written instrument signed by 
the defendant in person in open court before and with 
the approval of a judge or justice of a court having ju-
risdiction to try the offense.145 
In 1963, the Court of Appeals in People v. Duchin146 estab-
lished that a defendant had the right to waive his constitutionally pro-
tected right to trial by jury.
147
  The court declared that the right to a 
jury trial is designed to benefit the defendant, and thus, when a de-
fendant chooses to waive the right and be tried by a judge, he is enti-
tled to such a waiver.148  However, the court announced that this 
could only be accomplished if such waiver is made to the satisfaction 
of the presiding judge, it is clear that the waiver is being executed in 
good faith—not used to gain an unfair advantage—and the defendant 
is found to be aware of the repercussions of the decision.149 
A few years later, the Court of Appeals in People v. Ryan150 
dealt with the issue of juror substitution after the beginning of jury 
deliberations.
151
  In Ryan, defendants were convicted of first-degree 
robbery and second-degree assault after an alternate juror was substi-
tuted for an original juror who had become ill five hours into jury de-
liberations.152  Defendants subsequently challenged their convictions 
arguing that the alternative juror had been unconstitutionally substi-
tuted.153 
In Ryan, the Court of Appeals distinguished between pre-
deliberation substitutions and substitutions occurring after delibera-
tions had begun.
154
  The court recognized that the case before it, 
which involved substitution of a juror after deliberations had begun, 
 
145 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
146 190 N.E.2d 17 (N.Y. 1963). 
147   Id. at 17. 
148 Id. at 17. 
149 Id. at 17-18. 
150 224 N.E.2d 710 (N.Y. 1966). 
151   Id. at 711. 
152 Id.  
153 Id. 
154   Id. at 712. 
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was one of first impression.155  The court observed that prior to a 
1952 amendment of section 358-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
the procedural rule at issue, substitutions were only allowed during 
the pre-deliberation stage because alternate jurors were dismissed 
once the case was turned over to the jury.156  The court further ob-
served that after the amendment, section 358-a provided that: 
[a]fter final submission of a case, the court may dis-
charge the alternate jurors, or if the court deem it ad-
visable he may direct that one or more of the alternate 
jurors be kept in the custody of the sheriff or one or 
more court officers, separate and apart from the regu-
lar jurors until the jury have agreed upon a verdict.  If 
after the final submission of the case and before the ju-
ry have agreed upon a verdict, a juror die or become 
ill, or for any other reason he be unable to perform his 
duty, the court may order him to be discharged and 
draw the name of an alternate, who shall then take the 
place of the discharged juror in the jury room and the 
jury shall then renew its deliberations with the alter-
nate juror, who shall be subject to the same rules and 
regulations as though he had been selected as one of 
the original jurors.157 
Even though this provision authorized juror substitution after 
a case has been submitted to the jury, the Court of Appeals concluded 
that this procedure was not permissible under the New York State 
Constitution.158  However, instead of finding section 358-a unconsti-
tutional, the court merely nullified the jury’s verdict and ordered a 
new trial under Article I, Section 2 of the New York State Constitu-
tion.159  Specifically, the court interpreted the New York State Consti-
tution as recognizing a complete waiver of the right to a jury trial by 
a writing signed by defendant in open court and with the judge’s ap-
proval.160  As a result, the court held that consent solely by defense 
counsel did not amount to a constitutional waiver of the right to trial 
 
155 Ryan, 224 N.E.2d at 712. 
156 Id. at 711. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 713.  The court believed it would allow a decision by thirteen jurors instead of 
the constitutionally required twelve.  Id. 
159 Ryan, 224 N.E.2d at 713. 
160 Id. 
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by jury because the defendants were neither present nor consulted.161 
As a result of Ryan, the Legislature adopted Criminal Proce-
dure Law section 270.35, which is consistent with Article I, Section 2 
of the New York State Constitution; it expressly authorizes the sub-
stitution of an original juror after deliberations have begun, where de-
fendant personally consents in writing and in open court.162  Criminal 
Procedure Law, section 270.35 provides that 
[i]f at any time after the trial jury has been sworn and 
before the rendition of its verdict, a juror is unable to 
continue serving by reason of illness or other incapaci-
ty, or for any other reason is unavailable for continued 
service, or the court finds, from facts unknown at the 
time of the selection of the jury, that a juror is grossly 
unqualified to serve in the case or has engaged in mis-
conduct of a substantial nature, but not warranting the 
declaration of a mistrial, the court must discharge such 
juror.  If an alternate juror or jurors are available for 
service, the court must order that the discharged juror 
be replaced by the alternate juror whose name was 
first drawn and called, provided, however, that if the 
trial jury has begun its deliberations, the defendant 
must consent to such replacement.  Such consent must 
be in writing and must be signed by the defendant in 
person in open court in the presence of the court.  If 
the discharged juror was the foreperson, the court shall 
designate as the new foreperson the juror whose name 
was second drawn and called.  If no alternate juror is 
available, the court must declare a mistrial pursuant to 
subdivision three of section 280.10.163 
Another seminal case in New York’s history with regard to 
juror substitution is People v. Page.164  In Page, the Court of Appeals 
established the minimum requirements for compliance with Criminal 
Procedure Law section 270.35.  There, defendant was charged and 
subsequently found guilty of grand larceny in the third degree and 
 
161 Id. at 711, 713. 
162 Gajadhar, 880 N.E.2d at 867-68. 
163 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.35 (McKinney 1999). 
164 665 N.E.2d 1041 (N.Y. 1996). 
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“unauthorized use” of a motor vehicle, after he stole a car.165  Twelve 
jurors and two alternates were chosen to serve on the jury for the tri-
al.166  During the course of the trial, an original juror was substituted 
by an alternate, after he failed to attend court.167  Even though de-
fense counsel objected to the substitution of that juror, defendant 
failed to raise an issue regarding that substitution on his appeal.168 
During deliberations, one of the original twelve jurors fell ill 
and asked to be dismissed.169  As a result, the court conducted an ex-
tensive inquiry, determined that the juror was indeed sick and unable 
to continue with the deliberations, and thus, excused him.170  In turn, 
defense counsel requested that the court substitute the second alter-
nate for the sick juror due to defendant’s continued incarceration and 
the previous substantial delays.171  After defense counsel’s consent 
was recorded, the court directly questioned defendant as to whether 
he consented to the substitution and whether he had discussed it suf-
ficiently with counsel.172  Upon defendant’s verbal affirmative re-
sponse, but without written consent, the court substituted the juror 
and instructed the jury to start deliberations anew.173  The jury re-
commenced deliberations and the next morning agreed on a verdict to 
convict defendant.174 
Defendant subsequently “moved to set aside the verdict” 
based on Criminal Procedure Law, section 330.30, contending that 
the court’s substitution of one of the original twelve jurors during de-
liberations, absent defendant’s written consent, amounted to a consti-
tutional and statutory violation.175  The trial court denied defendant’s 
motion, declaring that the purpose for the “waiver rule” would be de-
feated if defendant were allowed to seek substitution of a juror and 
then claim that his consent was invalid.176  The appellate court, sub-
 
165 Id. at 1042. 
166 Id. 
167 Id.  The court substituted the juror without inquiring whether the juror would be return-
ing the following day.  Id. 





173 Page, 88 N.Y.2d at 1042. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 1042-43. 
176 Id. at 1043. 
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sequently, affirmed the decision.177 
Thereafter, defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, argu-
ing that his consent was deficient because it was not accompanied by 
a signed writing.178  In opposition, the State argued that the statute’s 
language requiring written consent for the substitution of a juror was 
merely a “technicality” and not a prerequisite to compliance, as long 
as the record reflected that the consent to substitution was “knowing, 
intelligent and voluntary.”179  The Court of Appeals explicitly disa-
greed with the lower courts’ decisions, concluding that both Criminal 
Procedure Law, section 270.35 and the state constitution required that 
consent be obtained through a writing signed in open court “in the 
presence of the court,” and thus, cannot be disregarded as a mere 
technicality.180 
The Court of Appeals in Page further explained that the pro-
ponents of the amendment proposed that consent be in writing in or-
der to protect a defendant’s rights and to ensure that a defendant un-
derstood the undertaking.181  Moreover, the court recognized that the 
proponents of Criminal Procedure Law, section 270.35 intended the 
writing requirement as a safeguard because an individual as a result 
of human habit will generally think twice before signing a paper, es-
pecially when it waives one of the most important privileges a citizen 
possesses.182  As a result, the Court of Appeals concluded that based 
on the history of constitutional waiver, the requirement that a defend-
ant signs a written waiver is “critical” to a “knowing, intelligent and 
voluntary waiver” of the right to a jury trial.183 
Two years later in People v. Ortiz,184 the Court of Appeals re-
affirmed its ruling in Page.  In Ortiz, defendant was convicted of 
third-degree criminal sale and third-degree “criminal possession of a 
controlled substance.”185  During trial and prior to deliberations, a ju-
ry member failed to show up in court, and when contacted, became 
hostile.186  As a result, the juror was dismissed and the trial judge in-
 
177 Id. 
178 Page, 88 N.Y.2d at 1043. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. at 1044. 
182 Id. 
183 Page, 88 N.Y.2d at 1044. 
184 705 N.E.2d 1199 (N.Y. 1998). 
185 Id. at 1199. 
186 Id. 
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quired whether the parties wished to consent to a juror substitution.187  
Counsel for both parties agreed and the court further inquired with 
defendant whether he wished to consent.188  Defendant responded in 
the affirmative and was later convicted.189  Defendant later appealed 
his conviction, claiming that his oral assent was invalid because 
Criminal Procedure Law, section 270.35 required a written instru-
ment for juror substitutions, before and after deliberations began.190  
In light of the principles espoused in Page and Ryan, the court held 
that there were no statutory violations of Criminal Procedure Law, 
section 270.35, observing that defendant’s oral consent to discharge a 
jury member was valid because it occurred prior to the beginning of 
deliberations.191 
In People v. Jeanty,192 the court further clarified its precedent 
regarding the procedural requirements for a valid juror substitution.  
There, three cases were consolidated for appeal on the question of 
whether the trial court properly applied Criminal Procedure Law, sec-
tion 270.35 in replacing original jurors with alternates.193  In 
Jeanty,194 the court replaced an original juror after he was involved in 
an accident and the court ascertained that he could not give a definite 
time for his return.195  In People v. Jones,196 the court replaced two 
jurors after they called the court and reported that they would not be 
able to appear for trial that day.197  In the third case, People v. 
Artis,198 the court replaced an ill juror after she stated that she was ill 
and was unable to continue with the trial that day.199 




189 Ortiz, 705 N.E.2d at 1199. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 1200. 
192 727 N.E.2d 1237 (N.Y. 2000). 
193 Id. at 1240. 
194 688 N.Y.S.2d 607 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1999).  Defendant was convicted of first-degree 
robbery, second-degree robbery, second-degree assault, fourth-degree criminal possession of 
a weapon, and third-degree assault.  Id. at 607. 
195 Jeanty, 727 N.E.2d at 1240-41. 
196 260 A.D.2d 647 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1999).  Defendant was convicted of second-
degree murder and second degree “criminal possession of a weapon.”  Id. at 647. 
197 Jeanty, 727 N.E.2d at 1241. 
198 694 N.Y.S.2d 5 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1999).  Defendant was convicted of second-
degree burglary and was sentenced as a “second felony offender.”  Id. at 5. 
199 Jeanty, 727 N.E.2d at 1241. 
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ute in 1996 intended to create a bright line rule.200  The court ex-
plained that if an original juror is absent and does not appear within 
two hours of the scheduled time for the resumption of a trial, and the 
court has undertaken a “reasonably thorough inquiry,” the court, in its 
discretion, may substitute the original juror.201  The court explained 
that the amendment was made as a result of a prior decision where a 
court’s substitution of an original juror after only forty-five minutes 
of the original juror not appearing, was found improper.202  The court 
also noted that the amendment was intended to ratify another decision 
in which the court found no error was committed where the trial court 
waited two hours before replacing an original juror who had not ap-
peared for the continuance of the trial.203  The court refuted defend-
ants’ assertions that: (1) the rule should be parsed and the require-
ment of a reasonable inquiry only be applied in cases where the cause 
of a juror’s absence is known; and (2) that the two-hour part of the 
rule should only be applied when the juror’s whereabouts are un-
known.204  In rejecting this view, the court stated that the statute made 
no distinction between the two scenarios.205 
Further, the court explained that if the reasonable inquiry 
shows that there is a likelihood that the original juror will not be ap-
pearing in two hours, the court may, in its discretion, decide to dis-
charge the juror.206  The court also explained that the two-hour period 
is “not an arbitrary cut off point,” but rather, “strikes a constitutional-
ly acceptable balance between the need to avoid uncertainty and de-
lay, and the defendant’s right to an orderly jury trial.”207  The court 
found that in each of the cases presented for appeal, the trial court 
conducted a “reasonably thorough inquiry” and determined that the 
jurors were not going to be returning within the two-hour window, 
and accordingly, held that the substitutions were made in accordance 
with Criminal Procedure Law, section 270.35(2).208 
The court’s ruling in this case, is one that, as it expressed, 
built on other previous holdings regarding the validity of a juror sub-
 
200 Id. at 1240. 
201 Id. 
202 Id. at 1242. 
203 Id. 
204 Jeanty, 727 N.E.2d at 1242. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. at 1243. 
207 Id. at 1245. 
208 Id. at 1244. 
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stitution.209  This holding is justified based upon the court’s careful 
balance of the countervailing interests of the defendant and the gov-
ernment.  As the court pointed out, the two-hour rule prevents either 
party from obtaining an unfair advantage based on the effect the ab-
sentee juror had on the case.210  The rule is practical because it allows 
for the prompt trial of a defendant and proper expenditure of limited 
judicial resources. 
Recently, in People v. Gajadhar,211 the Court of Appeals reaf-
firmed the precedent established in Page, that a defendant cannot 
consent to substitution of a juror after deliberations have begun, 
simply by way of oral consent.212  In Gajadhar, defendant was tried 
before a twelve-juror panel and other alternate jurors.213  After the 
presentation of the case, defense counsel informed the court that de-
fendant would not seek substitution of a juror in the event that an 
original juror was incapacitated, following the commencement of de-
liberations.214  As a result, the court dismissed the alternates pursuant 
to Criminal Procedure Law, section 270.35, which provided that a 
new juror may not be substituted for an original juror after delibera-
tions had begun, without defendant’s consent.215  During delibera-
tions, a juror fell ill and had to be hospitalized.216  Rather than face a 
mistrial, defendant requested that deliberations continue with the 
eleven remaining jurors.217  Defendant signed a waiver in open court, 
waiving his right to trial by a twelve-member jury, and the trial court 
granted defendant’s request.218 
Defendant was subsequently convicted of first-degree at-
tempted robbery and second-degree felony murder.219  Thereafter, de-
fendant filed an appeal, claiming his waiver was invalid because the 
state constitution prohibited a defendant from consenting to a jury 
consisting of less than twelve jurors.220  The Court of Appeals reject-
 
209 See supra text accompanying notes 202-03. 
210 See supra text accompanying note 207. 
211 880 N.E.2d 863 (N.Y. 2007). 
212 Id. at 868. 
213 Id. at 864. 
214 Id. 
215 Id. 
216 Gajadhar, 880 N.E.2d at 864. 
217 Id. at 863. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. at 864-65. 
220 Id. at 865. 
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ed this contention, concluding that defendant’s waiver was constitu-
tionally valid.221  The court explained that “because a noncapital 
criminal defendant is free to waive a jury entirely . . . it follows that if 
a juror becomes unavailable after deliberations have begun and there 
are no alternates that can be substituted, a defendant should be per-
mitted to request that an 11-member jury decide his fate.”222 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The precedent established by the aforementioned cases illus-
trates the vital role the right to a jury trial plays in our criminal justice 
system.  A jury trial is not just a formalistic right, it is a privilege 
guaranteed to a defendant.  As such, even though this right is one that 
remains fiercely protected over time, the courts recognized that pro-
cedures needed to be put in place to allow a defendant to relinquish 
the right and allow a court to substitute a juror, thus, striking an ap-
propriate balance between protecting a defendant and allowing him to 
have some control over his destiny. 
To accomplish this goal, a court must ensure that a defend-
ant’s waiver complies with constitutional, as well as statutory man-
dates.  The requirement that a defendant’s waiver of the right to a ju-
ry trial must be in writing is one that is essential to the protection of a 
defendant’s right as well as one that shows the impartiality of our ad-
versarial system.  The right to a jury trial and the right to consent to a 
waiver protects the defendant in whatever he or she decides is the 
best strategy for a favorable resolution of the case.  The requirement 
that a waiver be in writing also provides significant protection to the 
prosecution because it helps to preserve the defendant’s right on the 
record in the event that there is a claim that there was no waiver.  Al-
so, it allows the adversarial system to run more efficiently by pre-
venting people from later denouncing their waivers and utilizing 
more judicial resources to resolve an appeal.  Requiring a written 
waiver preserves the consent in writing, and as both the federal and 
New York State legislature wisely realized, gives the defendant a 
moment to reflect on the decision being made. 
It is also important to realize that there is a significant differ-
ence between pre-deliberation substitutions and substitutions occur-
ring after deliberations have begun, as the stage at which the substitu-
 
221 Gajadhar, 880 N.E.2d at 863. 
222 Id. at 869. 
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tion takes place serves to define the standards to be used to ensure 
that a defendant receives a fair trial.  In general, courts uniformly 
agree that pre-deliberation substitutions rarely pose a problem with 
regard to the question of whether a defendant was tried by a jury of 
twelve following such a substitution.  This is because, in essence, the 
substitution happens before the pivotal moment when the number of 
jurors deciding the case actually has a significant impact on a defend-
ant.  However, substitutions occurring after jury deliberations have a 
direct effect on the outcome of a case.  Accordingly, it is sensible that 
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